Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” fact sheet, October 5, 2021, U.S.
#Define stockpile stewardship and its purpose. verification#
Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “Transparency in the U.S. They are inferred by the authors from the best data available as of October 21, 2021.ī These figures are not known exactly but are much less uncertain than those marked ~. Note: These figures pertain to actual warheads and do not count one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber (as New START does). Warheads for heavy bombers stored at heavy bomber bases Table 4: Estimated Warhead Inventories for Russia and the United Statesĭeployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles The often-unarticulated justification (correct or not) has been that because these systems generally carry lower-yield warheads and are more suited to tactical missions, such as battlefield use, the risks of further escalation following the first use of NSNWs would be lower than in the case of the first use of strategic weapons. By contrast, with the primary exception of the now-defunct INF Treaty, nonstrategic delivery systems have been left out of arms control. New START and its predecessors have helped to cap and reverse the arms race and to mitigate the uniquely serious escalation risks created by the threats that Russia’s and the United States’ strategic nuclear forces pose to one another. Limiting strategic delivery vehicles and launchers has provided-and continues to provide-considerable value.
However, the complexities of extending arms control to any other warheads-even the warheads for heavy bombers that are stored on bases already subject to inspection-have so far prevented it. In the process, it is both possible and desirable to limit the number of warheads that are physically deployed on (most of) those delivery systems. New START’s traditional design focuses on limiting (most) long-range delivery vehicles and their launchers. (Table 4 provides an estimate of the Russian and U.S. No other warheads-those in storage, those being transported, and those that have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement-are even indirectly accountable. It also limits the number of heavy bombers, but they are treated as though each carries a single warhead even though they could carry many more. New START limits the 2,700 or so nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs-less than 25 percent of Russia and the United States’ combined total inventory of warheads. Matthew Harries contributed to this chapter.